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Abstract 
Information technology outsourcing (ITO) continues to be an important market and research topic in 
2016. The client-vendor relationship has been identified as one of the key driver to foster successful 
outsourcing engagements. But another stakeholder besides client and vendor that presumably highly 
influences this relationship is neglected in ITO research so far: the advisor. This research-in-progress 
paper propose to investigate how and why advisory services impact the relationship of clients and 
vendors and the project success in ITO engagements. To answer our research question, we build on 
principal-agent theory and social exchange theory as our theoretical lenses to explain the impact of 
advisory services on the client-vendor relationship. We develop our preliminary research model with 
three hypotheses and introduce our research design using a case study-based, mixed-method ap-
proach. Our planned outcome is a model explaining the role of advisors for improving ITO success. 
We conclude with an outlook about our next steps and the study’s planned contributions. 
Keywords: Information Technology Outsourcing, Client-Vendor Relationship, Advisory Services, Ad-
visors, Project Success, Principal-Agent Theory, Social Exchange Theory, Research Design 
1 Introduction 
Information technology outsourcing (ITO), the subcontracting of an organization’s information tech-
nology-related tasks to an external vendor, continues to be an important part of contemporary organi-
zations’ information technology (IT) strategy (Gartner 2015; Lacity et al., 2016). Current market ana-
lysts estimate the global market for ITO to have a total volume of $286 bn. USD in 2016, with an ad-
ditional expected growth rate of 5.7% for 2017 (Gartner 2016). 
The ITO client-vendor relationship is well acknowledged for being a key contributor to overall ITO 
success (Ang and Straub 1998; Levina and Ross 2003; Pannirselvam and Madupalli 2011). Within the 
rich body of knowledge on client-vendor relationships (e.g., Kern 1997; Kern and Willcocks 2000; 
Lee and Kim 1999), different elements have been investigated such as control or trust (Heiskanen et 
al., 2008), and formal contracts and the concept of relational governance (Gopal and Koka 2012). 
At the same time, while the client-vendor relationship’s importance is acknowledged, another stake-
holder besides client and vendor that presumably highly influences this relationship is neglected in 
ITO research so far: the advisor (Bapna et al., 2016; Lacity et al., 2016). A current market forecast 
expects the technology consulting market for “IT Strategy and Governance” with a total volume of 
$8.6 bn. USD in 2016, with an additional expected growth rate of 8.3% for 2017 (Gartner 2016). Such 
advisory services help clients develop a sourcing strategy, select sourcing locations, develop requests 
for proposals, evaluate provider bids, negotiate contracts, assist in transitions, build retained capabili-
ties, or review outsourcing relationship health (Lacity et al. 2016). The role of advisors has rarely been 
studied academically in ITO, yet clearly they are likely to be highly influential because of normative 
influences (Lacity et al. 2016). But a recent study showed that even though less than 5% of contracts 
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go through advisory services, the impact of such services are associated with significant positive con-
tract outcomes for clients and higher revenue for vendors (Bapna et al., 2016). Although the activities 
of advisory services are well-known, how and why advisory services affect revenue and contract out-
come is still a “black box”, and it is important to examine the specific mechanisms through which 
advisory services affect ITO success (Bapna et al., 2016). 
Hence, building upon the amount and diversity of past studies about client-vendor relationship models 
(Goles and Chin 2005; Kern and Willcocks 2002) and upon calls for further research on the role of 
advisors (Bapna et al., 2016; Lacity et al., 2016), we investigate more closely the role of advisors in 
affecting the client-vendor relationship as well as different sourcing outcomes. Hereby, our research is 
going to answer the following research question: 
RQ1. How and why do advisory services impact the relationship of clients and vendors in ITO en-
gagements? 
RQ2. How and why do advisory services impact the success of ITO engagements? 
To answer our research question, we build on principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Williamson 1979) and social exchange theory (Blau 1964) as our theoretical lenses to explain the im-
pact of advisory services on the client-vendor relationship. We propose to investigate the different 
dimensions of a client-vendor relationship in order to understand which dimensions are affected by the 
advisory services as well as how and why the advisory services have an impact on the affected dimen-
sions. Building upon a case-based research design, we plan to analyze qualitative as well as quantita-
tive data for the comprehensive analysis of advisory services within ITO projects. Our planned out-
come is a model explaining the role of advisors for improving ITO success. 
The remainder of this research-in-progress paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
related work and theoretical background on ITO and the client-vendor relationship, advisory services 
as well as our theoretical lenses. In the following section 3, we state our hypotheses based on findings 
from the literature and develop our baseline research model. In section 4, we describe our planned 
research design and approach, and finally give an outlook about our further steps and our study’s 
planned contributions in section 5. 
2 Related Work and Theoretical Background 
2.1 Information Technology Outsourcing Success 
Defining the success of ITO engagements is multi-level by nature, and various authors use different 
definitions and frameworks for explaining and evaluating ITO success within their research (Koh et 
al., 2004; Mathew and Chen 2013; Poston et al., 2010; Rai et al., 2009). We build on the well-cited 
and ground-breaking study by Lee and Kim (1999) on ITO client-vendor relationship quality, which 
used the concepts business perspective and user perspective to measure ITO success. Business per-
spective is hereby described by three terms: (1) strategic benefits (“ability of a firm to focus on its core 
business by outsourcing routine information technology activities”), (2) economic benefits (“ability of 
a firm to use expertise and economies of scale in human and technological resources of the service 
provider and to manage its cost structure through unambiguous contractual arrangements”), and (3) 
technological benefits (“ability of a firm to gain access to leading-edge IT and to avoid the risk of 
technological obsolescence that results from dynamic changes in IT”). The user perspective, on the 
other hand, describes the success rate of an ITO engagement from an end-user perspective, described 
as “the level of quality of offered services”. Both business and user perspective represent the client 
perspective, where the business is represented by the organization and the user is represented by the 
employees, which use the outcome of the project.  
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2.2 ITO Client-Vendor Relationship Quality 
One of the salient concepts that have emerged to describe the ITO process is the client-vendor rela-
tionship. A client-vendor relationship in ITO is defined as “an ongoing, long term linkage between an 
outsourcing vendor and customer arising from a contractual agreement to provide one or more com-
prehensive IT activities, processes, or services with understanding that the benefits attained by each 
firm are at least in part dependent on the other” (Goles and Chin 2005). It is a key success factor for 
achieving a positive and therefore successful outsourcing outcome (Lacity et al., 2010; Levina and 
Ross 2003). 
Building on this, the concept of ITO client-vendor relationship quality is defined as the “degree of 
connectedness between a client and a vendor in an aim to achieve specified goals” (Winkler et al., 
2008). Client-vendor relationship quality itself is a multi-dimensional concept, and numerous studies 
focusing on developing a comprehensive ITO client-vendor relationship model for predicting quality 
and success (e.g., Blumenberg et al., (2008); Goles and Chin (2005); Kern and Willcocks (2000); Lee 
and Kim (1999). 
Here as well we build on Lee and Kim (1999) and their partnership quality model. The model de-
scribes how partnership quality positively affects outsourcing success and how specific determinants 
such as participation, information sharing, age of the relationship, and cultural similarity affect the 
development of partnership quality in general. Partnership quality is defined by the concepts of trust, 
business understanding, benefit and risk share, conflict, and commitment. Building upon this work as a 
cornerstone, other studies showed how interaction determinants such as strategic fit and communica-
tion, structural determinants such as knowledge sharing routings, contractual determinants (e.g., con-
tract completeness), and contextual determinants (e.g., interdependence and service complexity) affect 
relationship quality (Blumenberg et al., 2008). However, the role of advisors has not been investigated 
in the context of client-vendor relationships. 
Other well-known studies in ITO apply theories and frameworks such as social exchange theory, 
transaction cost theory, or contract theory to develop explanatory models (Goles and Chin 2005; Kern 
and Willcocks 2000). For example, Kern and Willcocks (2000) use a conglomerate of five sub-
dimensions contextual quality, agreement quality, governance quality, interaction quality, and behav-
ioral quality. The contextual quality is related to “specific objectives and expectations (e.g., financial, 
business, technical and political), which in turn reflect the antecedent conditions” of the client-vendor 
relationship (Kern and Willcocks 2000). What is missing is a conceptualization of the effects of advi-
sory services on these dimensions. 
In sum, while the literature repeatedly points out that client-vendor relationship quality is important 
for ITO success in terms of cost reductions (e.g., Lee and Kim 1999), external influences on or support 
for such client-vendor relationships by advisors are not taken into account in these relationship mod-
els. Although recent empirical results show a positive impact of third-party advisory services on the 
ITO success, we know next to nothing about the impact on client-vendor relationships, or the theoreti-
cal mechanisms for this positive relation (Bapna et al., 2016). 
2.3 Advisory Services in Information Technology Outsourcing 
Striking examples for such a third party in ITO engagements are advisory firms such as Quint Wel-
lington Redwood, Avasant, Ernst and Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, or Deloitte 
(http://www.iaop.org/content/19/165/3880). Such advisors usually offer services to perform activities 
such as vendor capability assessment, price discovery facilitation, client-vendor matching and con-
tracting, or contract monitoring (Bapna et al., 2016). 
However, scant knowledge on the effects of advisory services exists. Most research on advisors has 
been done in mergers and acquisitions, investigating such phenomena as compensation (Kesner et al., 
1994), opportunism (Lee 2013), or expertness (Chen et al., 1993). It is known that advisors can have 
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positive as well as negative effects on decisions in a project. For example, advisors bring in expertise 
and experience from other projects, which help to reduce legal and knowledge barriers (Kesner et al., 
1994). In contrast to this, advisors have control over the information exchange in projects and they 
have the possibility to manipulate decisions. For example, Kesner et al., (1994) show that advisors in 
investment banking may have an incentive to raise premiums in merger and acquisition deals due to a 
higher compensation for themselves. Other studies employ agency theory, for example, to investigate 
knowledge asymmetry in business exchanges with hired professional service companies (Sharma 
1997). 
In an ITO context, the only available study until today shows that less than 5% of ITO contracts in-
volve advisors, but that the presence of advisors in ITO engagements is associated with significantly 
higher revenues for the vendors and positive contract outcomes for the clients (Bapna et al., 2016). 
However, the causal reasons and mechanisms for this remain unexplained. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies to date that examine the how and why of this influence for ITO suc-
cess, neither for cost reductions nor for any innovation outcomes. As of yet, the role of advisors in 
ITO remains underinvestigated, un-conceptualized, and not-theorized.  
To recap, client-vendor relationship quality is presumed to have a considerable influence on the ITO 
success, as have the third-party advisory services. However, the impact of the advisors that specifical-
ly leads to a more successful ITO outcome is still unexplored, and the mechanisms how this influence 
work remain unexplained. 
2.4 Conceptualizing Advisory Services in Information Technology Out-
sourcing 
In order to conceptualize the activities of client, vendor, and advisors, we apply two theoretical lenses 
– principal-agent theory and social exchange theory (SET). There is a rich body of knowledge in the
ITO literature using these two theories (Bahli and Rivard 2003; Ho et al., 2003; Kern and Willcocks
2000; Lee and Kim 1999). On the one hand, we build on principal-agent theory as an economic theory
because it explains the governance and contract aspects of ITO client-vendor relationships (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Williamson 1979), and supposedly should also help to understand the client-advisor /
advisor-vendor relationships. On the other hand, any relationship in ITO can be understood as a con-
tractual-based exchange relation (Kern and Willcocks 2000). This emphasizes the exchange aspects of
the relationship, which are the building blocks of SET. But each relationship (e.g., the relationship
between client and vendor as well as between client and advisor) has individual exchange aspects and
individual goals. The duality of both theories resonates with our understanding of an ITO client-
vendor relationship and its relation to ITO success.
Principal-agent theory tries to explain the difficulties that occur under conditions of incomplete and 
asymmetric information when a client (the principal) is contracting an outsourcing vendor (the agent) 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Williamson 1979). According to the theory, the agent should work in the 
interest of the principal, but each party in the relationship has their own goals such as profit gain. 
Therefore, the principal has costs to monitor the agent to fulfil the contract and meet the principal’s 
interests (Sappington 1991). However, there are three involved parties in ITO that we are interested in: 
client, vendor, and advisor. Thus, we have two separate principal-agent relationships, (1) between 
client and vendor and (2) between the client and the advisor. The client is most commonly the princi-
pal in both relationships but the expectations of the vendor and the advisor could differ considerably 
because of different roles (e.g., advisor as supporter, vendor as delivery unit). 
To shed more light on both relationships in detail, we suggest to employ SET. SET itself is one of the 
most influential conceptual paradigms in organizational behaviour, explaining relational aspects be-
tween different parties, for example, as series of interdependent transactions (Blau 1964; Emerson 
1962). Past research using SET argues that the interdependent transactions between exchange partners 
“have [under specific circumstances] the potential to generate high-quality relationships” (Cropanzano 
Linden and Rosenkranz /Impact of Advisory Services on Clients and Vendors 
Twenty-Fifth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Guimarães, Portugal, 2017 2508 
and Mitchell 2005), the circumstances being unclear. SET understands the ITO relationship as a dy-
namic process with interactions between both parties (Kern and Willcocks 2000; Lee and Kim 1999). 
It is a system of actions and reaction between client and vendor as well as client and advisor trying to 
overcome their information asymmetries (Cook 1977). 
3 Hypotheses Development and Research Model 
In the following, we introduce our preliminary baseline model, with which our study intends to start. 
The positive relationship between ITO client-vendor relationship quality and ITO success is generally 
known (Koh et al., 2004; Lee and Kim 1999). Therefore, as our baseline relationship based on prior 
studies covering the subject, we will evaluate the effect of ITO client-vendor relationship quality on 
ITO success based on the dimensions of the client-vendor relationship discussed in Section 2.2. There-
fore, we argue: 
Hypothesis 1. A higher ITO client-vendor relationship quality has a positive impact on ITO 
success. 
Even though only 5% of the ITO projects use the support of third-party advisory services, existing 
studies show the benefits of the external support resulting in better ITO outcomes (Bapna et al., 2016). 
But the studies on advisors do not theorize how positive effects on ITO success occur. By controlling 
for a number of project, client, and vendor characteristics through their activities, the presence of an 
advisor has been shown to also influence project success (Bapna et al., 2016; Lee 2001). Therefore, we 
argue:  
Hypothesis 2a. Third-party advisory services have a positive impact on ITO success. 
However, our main argument as regards the mechanisms behind is that advisors do not only have a 
direct effect of ITO success, but that this effect is also being mediated by an indirect effect on the ITO 
client-vendor relationship. Based on principal-agent theory and SET, we argue that the client uses the 
performance of the advisor to decrease the amount of incomplete and asymmetric information between 
the client and the vendor, and that this also fosters the client-vendor relationship quality. For example, 
third-party advisory services may impact the system of actions and reactions by enforcing the client in 
being more involved in such relationships (Gable and Chin 2001). Exemplary activities of the advisor 
are managing and influencing the bidding process (Hong and Shum 2002; Li and Zheng 2009), align-
ing the contract between client and vendor based on the advisor’s experience and knowledge (Susarla 
2012; Susarla et al., 2010), or monitoring the interaction including the contract between client and 
vendor (Bailey and Bakos 1997). Such activities refer to the dimensions of the client-vendor relation-
ship quality (e.g., agreement quality, interaction quality). The client learns from the experience and 
knowledge of the advisor and uses it for a more equal relationship to the vendor. 
Other studies show that typical activities of advisors such as knowledge sharing also have a positive 
impact on the ITO success. For example, Lee (2001) combined the concept of knowledge sharing with 
client-vendor relationship quality and demonstrated that knowledge sharing has a direct effect on the 
outsourcing success and an mediating effect over the client-vendor relationship quality. Therefore, our 
main hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2b. Third-party advisory services decrease the amount of incomplete and asym-
metric information between the client and the vendor and therefore have a positive impact on 
client-vendor relationship quality. 
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Figure 1. Initial Baseline Research Model 
4 Research Design and Approach 
We propose a case study-based, mixed-method research design due to two reasons. First, our study 
aims to investigate a complex real-world phenomenon, that is, the impact of the client-vendor relation-
ship on ITO success and especially the influence of third-party advisory services in such relationships. 
Case studies are especially suited for exploring new conceptual arguments and complex real-life phe-
nomena, where context is key (Siggelkow 2007; Yin 2003). Second, the phenomenon of third-party 
advisory services has not been well research and is not readily and easily accessible; existing studies 
show that less than 5% of ITO engagements use advisory services (Bapna et al., 2016). So any access 
at all, most likely through several single cases, needs to be considered (Yin 2003). 
Despite sometimes articulated reservations, case studies are well-suited for theory testing (Dubé and 
Paré 2003; Lee 1989a; Lee 1989b; Sarker et al., 2013). Specifically, our study will strive to use multi-
ple cases in order to answer our research question and test our baseline model. Multiple cases are also 
a way of contrasting different context and yet-to-be determined boundary conditions of our model, 
allowing to adapt or expand its concepts – or even to radically change it, resulting in a completely new 
model (Yin 2003). 
As regards sampling of suitable cases, we identified three criteria for our case selection: (1) besides 
the client and vendor, a third-party advisor has to be involved in the ITO projects; (2) client and ven-
dor should engage in intensive interactions – indicating possible activities regarding the five dimen-
sion of the client-vendor relationship – to ensure that the theoretical phenomenon is significant; and 
(3) the top management of the organizations should support our study in order to gain a deep insight in
the project with access to relevant informants, documents, meeting minutes, interpersonal interactions,
on-site visits, surveys and questionnaires, and so forth.
4.1 Data Collection 
We already started our data collection and data analysis. Our goal is to identify as many cases as pos-
sible up to a total number of 8 due to predict similar results (literal replication) and to predict con-
trasting results for anticipatable reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin 2003: p. 54) as well. At the mo-
ment of finalizing this paper, we have already four confirmations for gaining project access. 
We will employ a mixed-method design (Creswell 2013; Venkatesh et al., 2013; Venkatesh et al., 
2016) and strive to combine multiple data collection methods, including qualitative data sources (e.g., 
interviews, observations, and archival sources) as well as quantitative evidence (e.g., questionnaires, 
coded observations, log files). Interviews protocols, observation protocols, measurements, guidelines, 
questionnaire items, and procedures for case study conduct will be developed. Interviews will be de-
signed based on a set of pre-planned questions to cover the subject area, and a coding scheme for qual-
itative data based on the final research model will be constructed. The interview guidelines will none-
theless leave room for probing questions or deviations in order to uncover insights counter to or differ-
ent from our baseline model. 
Based on Miles et al., (2014) and following recommendations by Venkatesh et al., (2013), we will use 
a design that consists of a first qualitative, open and explorative phase to shape and refine the baseline 
Client-Vendor 
Relationship Quality ITO Success
Third-Party Advisory 
Services
H1 (+)H2b (+)
H2a (+)
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model, followed by a second quantitative phase with questionnaires, and a final qualitative phase for 
testing findings. This approach seems to be appropriate for our research approach because of the phe-
nomenon itself, and because we would like to explore the impact of third-party advisors on the client-
vendor relationship and its impact on the ITO success by querying project leaders or key project team 
members. If the first phase yields very unexpected findings or that are counter to the baseline model, 
we will adjust the model accordingly for the second and third phase. While trying to answer our re-
search question, we will also strive for a panel study with data collection in multiple points in time. In 
the end, we plan to corroborate our findings by interviewing key project members again. During the 
first and third phase, we will collect additional documents such as major deliverables, meeting 
minutes, and so forth to triangulate and for gaining another view on the project beside the interviews 
and questionnaires. 
We will follow established guidelines in creating our qualitative protocols and quantitative measure-
ment instruments (e.g., Moore and Benbasat 1991; O'Leary-Kelly and J. Vokurka 1998; Saldana 
2009). For the initial operationalization of our three concepts ITO success, client-vendor relationship 
quality, and third-party advisory services, we build on existing operationalizations identified in the 
literature. For example, we plan to reuse the operationalization of the client-vendor relationship quali-
ty from Lee and Kim (1999) and Oshri et al., (2015) or ITO success from Rai et al., (2009). The same 
procedure applies to potential control variables.  
4.2 Data Analysis 
We expect that our cases involve more than one unit of analysis (embedded case studies). This occurs 
when, within a single case, attention is also given to a subunit or subunits. Although the specific ITO 
projects represent the main unit of analysis, the individual project team members represent a subunit. 
Any subunit is part of/or embedded in the larger system (i. e., project) and it is important to understand 
the subunits in the larger system (Yin 2003, p. 49). 
First, in phase 1 we will follow established guidelines for testing theory with case studies in our analy-
sis (Dubé and Paré 2003; Lee 1989a; Lee 1989b; Sarker et al., 2013; Yin 2003). For example, the ana-
lytic strategy will use content analysis and common coding schemes for the qualitative data based on 
the research model, which are employed during pattern matching, comparing an empirically based and 
subsequently coded pattern with a predicted one based on the model. The patterns are related to the 
dependent and independent variables of the model. If the results are as predicted, we can draw a solid 
conclusion about the model. We will also use recommended techniques such as the use of rival expla-
nations for pattern matching of independent variables, explicit explanation building, time-series analy-
sis where possible, and logic models of chains of events over time and of cause-effect patterns, prede-
fined before the analysis based on the research model. At least three or more researchers or research 
assistants will perform all codings independently to increase validity. Specifically, it is planned to use 
the software MaxQDA. Furthermore, key informants will review draft case study reports and explana-
tions.  
Based on the qualitative data, primarily we take a closer look at the roles of advisory services and its 
change over time based on the project phase and project activities. We will investigate different pro-
ject phases and major project events based on the approach of Heiskanen et al., (2008). Although at 
the current stage we do not expect to engage into deeply theory development, we will not rule out oth-
er concepts and changes to our baseline model a priori. If the data in phase 1 leads us to conclude that 
changes are necessary, we will follow established guidelines for developing theory based on our case 
studies (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles et al., 2014). 
Second, the quantitative data in phase 2 will be used to validate and generalize our findings. Depend-
ing on the gathered data and an a priori power analysis, either univariate, bivariate, or multivariate 
data analysis techniques will be used (Straub et al., 2004). For example, data will be analysed using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the measurement model in terms of factor loadings, as 
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well as convergent validity and discriminant validity. Common method variance (CMV) will also be 
assessed to ensure that covariance among variables is not a result of the method used to collect data. 
The research model and hypotheses will be tested using regression analysis or covariance-based struc-
tural equation modelling (SEM) techniques (Byrne 2013), depending on the constructs of the final 
research model and the final measures. 
Third, the qualitative data collected in phase 3 (interviews, observations) as well as the supportive 
documentation (e.g., project status reports) will be used for triangulating, enhancing, and validating 
the quantitative data by applying content analysis and meta-analysis approaches (Miles et al., 2014). 
Guidelines for mixed method approaches will be used in combining both analyses (Creswell 2013). 
5 Outlook and Conclusion 
In the next steps, we will finalize our set of case studies for further analyzes. In parallel, we prepare 
the data collection by operationalizing our used concepts client-vendor relationship quality, ITO suc-
cess, and third-party advisors service based on existing literature for use in interview guidelines, cod-
ing schemes, and questionnaires. Furthermore, we will add additional reasonable factors wherever 
possible and when it creates benefits for our examination. We will use control variables that previous-
ly have been used in other studies. 
We will start with our data collection (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, and so forth) gradually with the 
final identification of our case studies. As of today, we have confirmations for four case study. De-
pending on the projects, we expect this phase to last until the mid of 2017. Afterwards, we will start 
with our data analysis. 
Our study aims to contribute to three different streams of research. First, we expand the role of third-
party advisory services in the environment of information technology, especially for ITO. We analyze 
the advisor’s performance and identify typical activity patterns of the advisor. Second, we will con-
tribute to the research gap of explaining how and why third-party advisory services influence the cli-
ent-vendor relationship (Bapna et al., 2016; Lacity et al., 2016). We would like to better understand 
what value advisors add to a client-vendor relationship and therefore to the overall ITO success. Third, 
we will show how both base theories contribute to our triangular setup of the client, vendor, and advi-
sor. For example, the principal-agent theory has been used mostly for a single relationship between a 
client and vendor. We add the role of the advisor to this relationship and therefore except to show the 
validity of the theory in network relationships. 
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